achieve full democratic maturity because of their communist past and the second is the absence of constitutional traditions and the inability to 'absorb' in a few years the benefits of the struggle for the limitation of power achieved by European countries over centuries. The responsibilities of European institutions for the framework of the application criteria for entry into the EU and the University Press, 2015, pp. 233-249 complex procedures put in place to prevent or to correct democratic deficiencies in the candidate countries have not been extensively analysed.
The seriousness of the ongoing processes in Hungary and Poland lies in the fact that through the tool of constitutional law the role of important checks and balances such as constitutional courts is in the process of changing or has already changed, and mainly for the worse. Generally, the institutions that naturally counterbalance the power of the political majority are currently being weakened (ombudsman, self-governing bodies of the judiciary, authority for the media or the press, prosecutors, etc.). Looking at the wider context, we notice a crisis of the very principle of majoritarian democracy, one which is justified in the name of governability. Other important defects in this context are the limits of post-communist constitutional 'engineering'. In fact, certain choices, which were appropriate for a transitional context in which checks and balances were still fluid, proved to be unsustainable in the current super-majority scenery. The choice in favour of a 'selective' electoral system has proved detrimental as has been, in some cases, the creation of a system of government with an opaque relationship between the President and the Prime Minister Behind it all lies the economic, and therefore social, crisis.
In both cases, the right-wing nationalist parties, who are in Government, challenge the manner in which the transition to democracy took place in 1989 although they came from the opposition to the old communist regime. The position of the Hungarian FIDESZ is clear on this point. Whereas the communists reformists have played a key role in the transition from the communist system of government and despite the fact that the heir to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, namely the socialists (MSZP), has ruled several times since the first free elections of 1990, officially bringing the country into the EU, the new Hungarian Fundamental Law is expressly directed against this political force and does not recognise any discontinuity between the communist and the post-1989 socialist leadership. The Polish case is different as until October 2015 it was difficult to find a stable and cohesive ruling majority because of the political framework and the electoral system. In fact this was the first time in the history of the former communist Poland that a one-party Government was formed. Another political aspect that is worth noting is that the centre-left forces are completely unrepresented in parliament (which has not happened in Hungary).
Despite the differences in party and electoral systems, in both countries there is a majority conservative Government with overwhelming power. But while FIDESZ has had a constitutional majority since 2010 (constitutional 'outrages' were perpetrated before the adoption of the new FL, with 12 laws amending the old Constitution), the PiS could limit itself to implement its legislative program and take advantage of some mistakes of the old laws regulating the activity and composition of the Constitutional Tribunal, such as the election of constitutional court judges by a simple majority of the Sejm (this is a communist heritage as the election by a simple majority was provided for in the Sejm Regulation of 1986). As we know, this procedure had many negative consequences.
The case of Romania is very peculiar. The Romanian constitutional crisis -with the involvement again of European institutions, primarily the European Commission and the Venice Commission -'exploded' rather suddenly between June and July 2012. The crisis was resolved almost immediately even though it was preceded (and followed) by unresolved problems of political and institutional nature. The three countries examined are not comparable in terms of their historical and democratic development. However, from a constitutional perspective each has specific defects of its own in terms of their constitutional engineering.
Hungary
-The procedure for amending the constitution and for adopting a new constitution is the same (the parliament is both the legislative and constituent body). The process is easy to implement not only in terms of the majority required but also because the initiative for amendments is easy to put forward as it only requires a request from a single deputy and there are no explicit limits to the constitutional amendments.
-There is an excessive use of cardinal laws.
-There are no provisions to fight against 'anti-system' political parties (at least in the FL).
-The rules for the election of constitutional judges have been simplified for the benefit of the ruling majority.
Poland
-The judges of the Constitutional Tribunal are elected by one house of the Parliament based on a simple majority (the proceeding is required by law but not by the Constitution).
-The Constitutional Tribunal is regulated by ordinary and not constitutional law.
-Requirements to elect judges of the CT provided by the Constitution are quite vague
Romania
-The role of the President and the Prime Minister are not well demarcated and this causes problems even outside of cohabitation (a distorted and incomplete copy of the French model).
-Abuse and excessive use of emergency decrees by the Government; this aspect is not well regulated in the Constitution.
-A poorly differentiated bicameralism especially regarding legislative powers of the houses.
-The autonomy granted in 2003 to the organ of self-government of the judiciary is leading to its politicization.
The role of the constitutional courts in the post-communist transition
Considering that in all three countries constitutional courts have been under attack by the political majority, it is worth reflecting on their role in the post-communist transition. Most of them had a very active role, which has repeatedly brought them into conflict with the Government in office.
This strong role has been possible for a number of reasons. First, some of these courts have been super-equipped and have often delivered judgments on the relationship between the branches of government, so determining the real functioning of the form of government, thereby counterbalancing the shortcomings of the constitutional text and of the political system. The access to the courts is very broad. In some cases the constitutional courts have been forced to work with interim or otherwise incomplete constitutional texts, or with constitutional 'patchworks' (as in Poland until 1997) so they had a great deal of freedom of action (and made free use of international standards on human rights). The 'moral' legitimacy of constitutional judges (no compromises with the past, famous dissidents or leading actors of the transition period) has been a relevant factor in some countries in order to increase the authoritativeness of the courts 10 .
The powerful role of the courts has been criticized by some commentators because it was perceived they had overshadowed the legitimacy of new parliaments. The latter were in some cases considered by public opinion to be the same as their powerless predecessors 11 . In fact such a leading role was acceptable and necessary perhaps only in the first few years following the transition.
The common features of the so-called 'fourth generation' constitutional courts, however, should not overshadow the differences between countries. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal arises from a communist concession to the opposition forces and had a series of functional limitations until 1997.
10 Please refer to A. Di Gregorio, La giustizia costituzionale in Russia, Milano, Giuffré, 2004 . 11 S. Holmes, Back to the Drawing Board, in East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 2, no. 1, 1992 equal to that reserved to the other member States. This has encouraged, in many cases, a jealous attitude to national sovereignty. The importing of Western models has not proved successful in all respects. While for the catalogues of rights there was no alternative, more gradualism in the dismantling of social benefits and a measured transition to a market economy would have been preferable.
As for the membership in the Council of Europe (and the influence of the Venice Commission and the Court of Strasbourg), conditionality was less stringent than in the EU, because of the different purposes of this regional organization, meant primarily during the last 26 years to promote in general terms 'rule of law, democracy and human rights' in the new members of the communist tradition.
A limit observed during the conditionality process is the fact that the difference between democracy and rule of law has not been sufficiently explained. The triad 'rule of law, democracy and human rights' have not been perceived as inseparable since in Romania, Hungary and Poland the Governments have invoked the principle of democracy as a means of using the majority will of the voters to contest a legalistic approach to the rule of law.
As for the involvement of European institutions, as authoritatively argued 13 in Hungary, Romania and Poland there have been grounds for the application of Article 7 TEU, the so called 'nuclear option' which could entail the suspension of voting rights' of the Member States. But the EU has adopted different solutions in the three cases as a result of purely political considerations (the Hungarian FIDESZ is well placed in the European Popular Party while the Polish PiS is more isolated; the new Commission wants to be more assertive than the previous one headed by Barroso when it comes to the rule of law principle). All of this emphasises the weakness of the EU, especially when combined with the many legal and political problems that Art. protection of media freedom there are no adequate legal instruments at EU level.
Conclusions
As Secondly, we must avoid making general remarks given that Hungary and Poland were considered first-in-class until recently. If the Polish case is so striking even more so than the Hungarian one, it is because its democratic stability was taken for granted. We must also distinguish the inconsistencies in the constitutional text from those of the political system (including the electoral system) and the 'resilience' of the constitutional culture that has arisen so far, an aspect that is very well described by Solyóm in the Hungarian case 14 . The Hungarian Constitutional Court, which has experienced a kind of 'anticipatory democracy' proved to be useful in the current slowdown phase.
On the subject of constitutional culture, it is useful to remember what the Venice Commission stressed in its 2012 opinion regarding the events in Romania, which can also be applied to the other two cases. The Commission reflected on the Romanian institutional context noticing the absence of a genuine constitutional culture of mutual respect and sincere cooperation between the institutions:
"Compliance with the rule of law cannot be restricted to the implementation of the explicit and formal provisions of the law and of the Constitution only. It also implies constitutional behaviour and practices, which facilitate the compliance with the formal rules by all the constitutional bodies and the mutual respect between them … Democracy cannot be reduced to the rule of the majority; majority rule is limited by the Constitution and by law, primarily in order to safeguard the interests of minorities. Of course, the majority steers the country during a legislative period but it must not subdue the minority; it has an obligation to respect those who lost the last elections".
We must therefore look back at the modalities and protagonists of the transition and the following period. In Poland, for example, the roots of today's phenomena are to be found in the dynamics of Other negative things come out of the transition period such as certain opaque institutional mechanisms whose danger over time is compounded if left in the wrong hands. As mentioned above, the hostility towards the role of constitutional courts, both in Poland and in Hungary, is based on their counter-majoritarian role and in particular on their potential threat to the parties currently in power. But if it is easy to identify the reasons for this offensive against the court in the Hungarian case given, as mentioned earlier, its high prestige and the fact that it virtually dictated the constitutional law of the transition period (Solyóm), it is less obvious in the Polish case. Here, the roots of the conflict are to be found not so much in the authoritativeness of the CT (gradually increased from 1997 onwards) but rather in a series of rulings that it delivered in 2006-2007 during the first Government ruled by PiS (but in a political condition much less favourable than today).
This leads us to a number of further reflections concerning the post-communist constitutionalism in general, and that of the most advanced countries, such as Poland and Hungary, in particular. Firstly, we need to consider the limits of post-communist constitutional engineering, including electoral legislation. Secondly, the mistakes due to the haste of post-communist constituent legislatures.
